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Abstract

Conventional wisdom is that sovereigns will rarely, if ever, default on their
external debts in circumstances where it is clear that they have the capacity
to pay. The first line of defense against the errant sovereign is its concern
about reputation. It may have to tap the external debt markets again in the
future; and there is the fear that the markets will extract revenge. But
reputational constraints do not always work because some governments
heavily discount future costs in favor of current benefits. When reputational
constraints fail, however, a second line of defense is supposed to come into
play. That line of defense is comprised of contractual and legal remedies.
Both lines of defense broke down in the case of Ecuador’s default in late
2008. The breakdown of the second line of defense is significant because
this was the first time that the modern theory of supermajority creditor control
of sovereign debt problems was tested in practice. This Article begins the
coroner’s inquest into the reasons for this breakdown and how similar
situations might be averted in the future.
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Introduction
In late 2008, the Republic of Ecuador defaulted on its
international bonds. This was not a novel occurrence. In a study published
in 1993 (“The Risks of Sovereign Lending: Lessons from History,” Sept.
1993), Salomon Brothers concluded that Ecuador had the worst debt
performance record of any of the 70 payment-challenged countries they
surveyed. There have been two additional defaults since 1993. But this
latest default was certainly different. Two highly concessional debt
restructurings (one in 1995 and the second in 2000), together with record
high oil prices, had left Ecuador in 2008 with an enviably manageable
external debt profile.
The motivation for this default was domestic politics, not
financial necessity. It was the first time in modern history that a sovereign
debtor had demanded that its external commercial creditors write off most of
their claims (65 percent, as it turned out), without advancing a plausible
argument that financial distress warranted such extraordinary debt relief.
The demise of the doctrine of “absolute” sovereign immunity in
the second half of the last century left sovereign debt markets operating on
the assumption that the menacing prospect of legal enforcement of debt
contracts, coupled with a fear of market exclusion and the prospect of a
censorious raised eyebrow from the multilateral financial institutions, would
act as an effective brake on casual sovereign defaults. In the Ecuador case,
however, the system designed to protect the interests of the bondholders
against such a default failed. The creditors were left with no feasible option
apart from knuckling under to a demand that they forgive 65 percent of their
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claims against a sovereign debtor that visibly had the resources to continue
servicing those obligations.
The questions now are how could this have happened and
what needs to change in order to ensure that the traditional legal balance
between sovereign debtors and their commercial creditors is restored?
The Historical Context
There has been a steady movement over the last 15 years
toward supermajority creditor control of sovereign debt workouts. The
textual evidence of this is visible in the documentation used for the issuance
of bonds by emerging market sovereigns. For example:
x

Acceleration of bonds following an event of default now typically
requires a vote of at least 25% of the bondholders (as opposed to
the traditional format that permitted each bondholder to accelerate
its own bonds following an event of default).

x

Collective action clauses, first introduced into New York law
sovereign bonds in 2003, are now standard in most emerging
market sovereign bonds. These clauses permit the payment terms
of the bonds to be amended with the consent of 75% of the
bondholders. Prior to this innovation, the payment terms of a New
York law-governed sovereign bond could not be altered without the
unanimous consent of the bondholders.

x

An increasing number of these bonds are being issued pursuant to
trust indentures in the New York market and trust deeds in the
London market (in contrast to the fiscal agency structures used in
prior periods). Trustees represent the interests of the
bondholders; fiscal agents are agents of the issuer of the bonds
and owe no fiduciary duties to the bondholders.

x

Most recently, several New York law trust indentures for sovereign
bonds have centralized all powers to enforce the bonds in the
hands of the trustee. The traditional U.S. practice (an invariable
practice in corporate bonds) permits each bondholder to sue for its
share of a payment that was not made on a scheduled maturity
date. Full centralization of enforcement powers in the hands of the
trustee has long been the norm in English law trust deeds.
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The principal motivation for these documentary changes was a
desire to replicate, in the sovereign context, the supermajority creditor control
of debt workouts that exists in most corporate insolvency regimes. If
unforeseen circumstances prevent normal servicing of the debts, the
proponents of this approach argued, the judgment of the large majority of the
creditors should control whether and how to adjust payment terms in
response to those circumstances. Individual creditors should not be given an
opportunity to disrupt a consensual restructuring or to exploit the
concessions granted by the vast number of their fellow lenders.
Supermajority creditor control, however, never implied that
bondholders would forfeit their rights to enforce their claims through legal
proceedings. In particular, the movement toward the use of trust structures
for emerging market sovereign bonds was not intended to dilute creditors’
legal rights, but merely to centralize those powers in the hands of a trustee
who would exercise those rights for the ratable benefit of all creditors.
Naturally, this approach assumed that the entity appointed to exercise these
centralized powers (the trustee) would, if and when necessary, acquit itself of
its duty to preserve, protect and defend the interests of the bondholders.
These assumptions, and this legal architecture, were tested for
the first time in connection with Ecuador’s 2008 default on two series of its
bonds and the country’s subsequent offer to repurchase those bonds at a
very deep discount. As things turned out, the assumptions proved to be
fragile and the legal architecture failed in its principal purpose.
The Default
The latest Ecuador default had its origins in the Ecuadorian
presidential election of 2006. One of the candidates, Rafael Correa,
campaigned on a platform that implicitly promised to redirect into social
programs a large portion of the money that Ecuador devoted to making
payments on its external debt. The fly in the buttermilk, as Correa (an
economist by training) must certainly have known, was that Ecuador’s debt
burden was actually quite manageable. The country had, just the year
before (2005), issued bonds in the international markets highlighting its very
favorable debt ratios. Correa himself had been the Ecuadorian Minister of
Finance for a portion of 2005 while that bond issue was being prepared.
Correa’s campaign message found favor with the Ecuadorian
electorate and he became President of the country in January 2007. Lacking
a financial justification for demanding concessions from the country’s
creditors, the Correa administration decided that it would seek a legal pretext
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for its hostile debt policy. The slogans for this were lying conveniently at
hand courtesy of the academic debate about the early twentieth century
doctrine of “odious” sovereign debts; a debate that had rekindled following
the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The original (circa 1927) doctrine
defined odious debt very narrowly, too narrowly it seems for the taste of
some modern commentators. This may explain the shift in terminology
toward an even less precise, but apparently more inclusive, category of
“illegitimate” debts.
Shortly after taking office in 2006, Correa appointed a
“Commission of Integral Audit of Public Credit” and ordered it to examine
Ecuador’s foreign debts. That Commission, composed principally of local
and foreign activists for third world debt cancellation, duly reported its finding
that virtually all of Ecuador’s external debt stock was fatally tainted by
illegality and illegitimacy.
The Commission’s standards for identifying illegitimate/illegal
debts were always original and occasionally risible. To give just a flavor, the
Commission concluded that the wickedness, corruption and incompetence of
Ecuador’s debt negotiators over the prior 30 years were revealed by the
negotiators’ supine acceptance of contractual provisions such as a choice of
foreign governing law, submission to foreign court jurisdiction and waiver of
sovereign immunity.
When the Correa administration took office, Ecuador had three
outstanding international bond issues, two had been issued in 2000 as part
of the settlement of Ecuador’s last default on its Brady Bond and Eurobond
debt. Shortly after the official release of the Commission’s report, Ecuador
ceased payments on both of these bonds. A third external bond, issued in
2005 (the year in which Correa had served a stint as finance minister),
continued to be serviced.
The Buyback Offer
Following the default in November 2008, the market price of
Ecuador’s bonds sank into the low 20s (the bonds had been trading at or
close to par as recently as end-2007.) Rumors quickly circulated that the
Government of Ecuador had embarked on a program to acquire (through two
financial intermediaries) between 30-50% of the total outstanding amount of
the two defaulted bonds at the deeply discounted prices occasioned by the
Government’s default and threats of default.
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On April 20, 2009, six months after the first default, Ecuador
launched a cash buyback offer to repurchase the two series of defaulted
bonds. The transaction was structured as a modified Dutch auction with a
minimum price of 30 cents on the dollar of outstanding principal.
The disclosure document that accompanied the buyback offer
had several features that bear upon this story:
x

The Government utterly repudiated the two bonds it was
seeking to repurchase; holders were told that Ecuador had
no intention of ever resuming normal payments on those
instruments.

x

Although the indenture governing the two defaulted bonds
expressly treated any bonds owned or controlled directly or
indirectly by Ecuador as “not outstanding” for voting
purposes, the offering document failed to disclose whether
any bonds were then under the ownership or control of
Ecuador and, if so, how many.

x

Ecuador threatened in the offering document to place the
repurchased bonds in the hands of a nominee whom “the
Republic does not control”, and then to convene a
bondholders’ meeting for the purpose of amending
(unspecified) provisions of the old bonds. The fatuity of the
proposition that Ecuador would hand over the repurchased
bonds to a truly independent, “vote your conscience”,
custodian did not diminish the potency of the threat that the
Government would try to circumvent the indenture’s
protections in this regard.

x

Any doubt that this was a “willingness to pay”, not a
“capacity to pay,” driven default was removed by a perusal
of the disclosure document. External debt to GDP, for
example, was disclosed to be less than 20% and total debt
to GDP stood at 26.1%. By contrast, Ecuador’s debt to
GDP at the time of its prior debt restructuring in 2000 was
100.5%.

x

The disclosure document was accompanied by a transmittal
letter from the Ecuadorian Minister of Finance. The Minister
characterized the findings of the Commission of Integral
Audit concerning the illegality/illegitimacy of Ecuador’s
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The Theory
The trust indenture that governed the two series of defaulted
Ecuadorian bonds set out the bondholders’ legal remedies following a
default. Holders of 25% (in principal amount) of each series could accelerate
their series by notice to the trustee. The indenture, however, carefully
preserved for the trustee the discretion to accelerate the bonds on its own
volition, without waiting for a bondholders’ vote. This power was presumably
to be exercised in extreme cases when time was of the essence or the
character of the default and the issuer’s intentions were unambiguously
hostile to the interests of the bondholders.
To safeguard the integrity of this voting process, the indenture
treated as “not outstanding” any bonds owned or controlled, directly or
indirectly, by the issuer. If the trustee was in any doubt about whether the
issuer had reacquired its own bonds, the indenture gave the trustee the
power to demand a certification to this effect from the issuer. The issuer was
required to respond “promptly”.
Following the occurrence of an Event of Default, the trustee
was given the discretionary power “to protect and enforce the rights vested in
it by this Indenture by such appropriate judicial proceedings as the Trustee
shall deem most effectual …”. Apart from this discretionary authority, an
enforcement action for the recovery of an accelerated amount required the
holders of 25% of the outstanding bonds of a series to request the trustee to
commence such an action and to offer the trustee an indemnity against its
costs, expenses and liabilities incurred in doing so. The indenture specified
that the trustee had 60 days in which to decide whether it would enforce the
bonds after receiving such a request; if the trustee failed to do so within this
time period, enforcement rights reverted to the bondholders.
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The Reality
Practice did not live up to theory. Even though the issuer had
publicly repudiated the instruments (it’s hard to imagine a more serious
provocation), the trustee did not exercise its discretion to accelerate either
series of bonds or to commence an enforcement action. The holders of one
series eventually mustered the 25% vote needed to force the trustee to
accelerate that series, but the authors understand that the second series
missed the 25% voting threshold by just a small amount.
Because any bonds owned or controlled by Ecuador should
have been deemed “not outstanding” for purposes of these votes, the trustee
never actually knew the size of the universe of bondholders entitled to vote
for acceleration or to request an enforcement action. And without knowing
the denominator of the voting fraction, the trustee obviously could never
ascertain whether the votes it had received constituted the necessary 25%.
The authors understand that the trustee asked for a prompt
certification from Ecuador as to the number of bonds it owned or controlled; a
demand that Ecuador seems to have ignored. The trustee was apparently
not prepared to draw a negative inference from this further breach of the
indenture and continued its policy of refusing to accelerate the instruments
on its own volition. (By way of comparison, the trustee for Ecuador’s 1997
Eurobonds did accelerate those bonds on its own volition.)
Now in a normal situation -- one in which a borrower stops
paying its debts because it lacks the money to do so -- this passivity on the
part of the trustee may have just delayed what would in any event have been
a painfully drawn out enforcement process. But Ecuador was far from being
an impecunious debtor, as evidenced by the fact that within six months of the
default it had launched a cash tender for its own bonds. Once the buyback
operation was announced, everyone knew that within a matter of a couple of
months the issuer would be forced to mobilize -- at a specific place on a
specific day -- the hundreds of millions of dollars needed to close the
buyback with the tendering bondholders.
Whether those funds could have been shielded from
attachment by an aggressive trustee is a question to which we shall never
know the answer. But this much seems certain -- the closing of the cash
buyback represented the first, the best and perhaps the only opportunity for
the creditors to recover a sizeable portion of their claims. The trust indenture
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deprived the individual bondholders of their ability to pursue legal remedies
on their own; they were thus wholly reliant on the trustee’s vigilance and
enterprise to protect their interests.
When it became clear that their contractually-appointed
champion was not eager to enter the lists, most of the bondholders
apparently felt that they had little choice but to accept Ecuador’s buyback
offer. The final price of 35¢ on the dollar was accepted by holders of
approximately 91% of the bonds.
Contractual Changes
Was this just an isolated case of a bovinely passive trustee, or
should there be changes in the standard forms of New York law trust
indentures for sovereign issues that would prevent this sort of mischief from
recurring?
Trustee Responsibilities. The form of trust indenture that has
been used for the last ten years for sovereign bond issues differs in one very
material respect from the trust indentures used for publicly-issued corporate
debt securities in the United States. The latter, reflecting an explicit
requirement of the U.S. Trust Indenture Act of 1939, imposes on a trustee
only administrative duties -- right up to the point that an event of default has
occurred. After a default, the trustee’s fiduciary responsibilities ratchet up
sharply. A trustee for a corporate debt issue, confronted with a default, must
exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it by the indenture, and use
the same degree of care and skill in their exercise, as a prudent man would
use under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs. This is a fairly
high fiduciary standard.
A contractual provision mandating a higher post-default
standard of trustee responsibility is missing from the form of trust indenture
that has been used for New York sovereign bond issues, including the two
defaulted Ecuador bonds. At some point in its drafting history, someone
(probably a lawyer representing a trustee) realized that sovereign trust
indentures do not need to comply with the requirements of the U.S. Trust
Indenture Act. That drafter accordingly seized the opportunity to strip out of
the document the provision that contains the living, beating heart of a
trustee’s contractual fiduciary duty to its debtholders. And after this bit of
surgery, the document was replicated again and again for future deals, as
standard financial contracts often are. Whatever one’s views about the
propriety of the trustee’s behavior in the recent Ecuador affair, therefore, the
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trust indenture in question did not require more aggressive action by the
trustee.
The Ecuador case demonstrated how a sovereign debtor can
exploit this documentary weakness if it is determined to do so. The authors
can see no reason why trust indentures used for future sovereign issues
should not follow the corporate model and impose more stringent
responsibilities on a trustee to protect the interests of the debtholders once
the instrument goes into default.
Orphans and Mercy. When a secondary market in the trading
of commercial bank loans to sovereign borrowers began in the mid-1980s,
the banks quickly realized that it invited howling moral hazard. A sovereign
debtor could default on its interest payments, drive down the secondary
market price of its paper and then use the money it should have paid in
interest to repurchase and cancel the debt in full. Default thus became the
enticing prelude to sound debt management. The phenomenon was
described in these pages (IFLR, April 1991 at 10,11) as being equivalent to
the old saw about the boy who murders his parents and hurls himself on the
mercy of the court as an orphan.
The banks tried to arrest this temptation by including clauses in
their restructuring agreements that forbade a borrower from directly or
indirectly acquiring interests in its own debts at any time that those loans
were in default. The banks recognized, of course, that a borrower willing to
default on a loan might not balk at breaching a covenant of this kind. But the
banks believed that third-party financial intermediaries -- the ones who
quietly repurchased debts on the secondary market for sovereign clients -would be reluctant to collude in such an explicit breach.
These prohibitions against a borrower repurchasing its
defaulted debts were carried over into the Brady bonds that replaced the
commercial bank loans in the early 1990s. Ecuador’s Brady bonds, for
example, had just such a restriction. The clauses were unobtrusively
dropped, however, from the new Eurobonds and Yankee bonds issued by
these countries later in the 1990s. The justification, if there was one, must
have been that no sovereign bond issuer would risk its market reputation by
deliberately defaulting in order to manipulate the price of its bond to its own
benefit.
That theory is probably correct, but it does not account for the
possibility that politicians in the debtor country might order a cessation of
payments for domestic political reasons. In these circumstances, the legal
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ability to repurchase defaulted debts makes the debtor the principal
beneficiary of its own default. Add a deliberate concealment of the true
beneficial ownership of the bonds to frustrate syndicate voting, a complaisant
trustee and a widely-dispersed bondholder class, and the result can be an
effective emasculation of creditor legal remedies.
Sovereign Defaults
The 1993 Salomon Brothers study referred to in the opening
paragraph of this article ended with a comforting assurance to prospective
investors in sovereign debt paper. “Countries do not default lightly,” said the
Salomon report. “The cases of pure ‘unwillingness to pay’ are few and occur
under circumstances of extreme political instability.”
That conclusion accurately summarized the prior 200 years of
historical sovereign debt performance. If the Ecuador example proves
infectious, it may be accurate no longer.
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Ecuador Indenture Version

Duties and Responsibilities of the Trustee
The Trustee undertakes to perform such duties and only such
duties as are specifically set forth in this Indenture and the Terms. No
provision of this Indenture shall be construed to relieve the Trustee from
liability for its own grossly negligent action, its own grossly negligent failure to
act or its own willful misconduct, except that:
(a)

(i)
the duties and obligations of the Trustee shall be
determined solely by the express provisions of this Indenture,
and the Trustee shall not be liable except for the performance
of such duties and obligations as are specifically set forth in this
Indenture, and no implied covenants or obligations shall be
read into this Indenture against the Trustee; …
*

*

*

*

Recommended Version *
Duties of Trustee
(a)

If an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing, the
Trustee shall exercise such of the rights and powers vested in it
by this Indenture, and use the same degree of care and skill in
their exercise, as a prudent man would exercise or use under
the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs.

(b)

Except during the continuance of an Event of Default:
(i)
The Trustee need perform only those duties that are
specifically set forth in this Indenture and no others. …
*

*

*

*

*

From American Bar Association, Model Simplified Indenture.
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